Adjuncts

Dr Garry Young

Adjunct Research Fellow.
Canberra

Before accepting the adjunct position at CSU in January 2021, Garry spent 20 years working in philosophy and psychology departments in England and Australia. He is currently employed as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at UNSW Canberra.

Garry has extensive undergraduate and postgraduate teaching expertise and experience in philosophy and psychology, particularly in relation to virtual ethics, monothematic delusions, embodied cognition, and philosophical psychology.

Garry’s research interests include the ethics of enacting immoral actions within virtual environments (e.g., enacting murder or other immoral acts within a video game), the role patient experience plays in the aetiology of monothematic delusions (e.g., Cotard delusion (the delusion belief you are dead) or the Capgras delusion (the delusion belief that a close family member or friend is an impostor)), and the relationship between procedural and declarative knowledge.

Authored Books

Young, G. (2021) Fictional immorality and immoral fiction. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Whitty, M.T. & Young, G. (2016). Cyberpsychology: The study of individuals, society and digital technologies. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Young, G. (2016). Resolving the gamer’s dilemma: Examining the moral and psychological differences between virtual murder and virtual paedophilia. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-3-319-46595-1

Young, G. (2014). Ethics in the virtual world: The morality and psychology of gaming. London: Routledge.

Young, G. (2013). Philosophical psychopathology: Philosophy without thought experiments. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Young, G. & Whitty, M.T. (2012). Transcending taboos: A moral and psychological examination of cyberspace. London: Routledge.

Young, G. (2010). Delusional misidentification. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Journal Articles

Young, G, & Coren, D. (in press, 2021). Individually sufficient and disjunctively necessary conditions for moral responsibility. Acta Analytica. DOI 10.1007/s12136-020-00453-x

Young, G. (2020). Objections to the “God Machine” thought experiment: Why it fails as a coherent example of moral intervention by technological means. Philosophia, 48(2), 831-846.DOI 10.1007/s11406-019-00095-3

Young, G. (2019). An expressivist account of the difference between poor taste and immorality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 22(2), 465-482. DOI 10.1007/s10677-019-09998-2

Young, G. (2019). Knowledge how, procedural knowledge, and the type-token action clause. Acta Analytica, 34(3), 327-343. DOI 10.1007/s12136-018-0376-1

Young, G. (2018). How would we know if moral enhancement had occurred? Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 32(4), 587-606. DOI 10.5325/jspecphil.32.4.0587

Young, G. (2017). A response to Coren’s objections to the principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for moral responsibility. Philosophia, 45(3), 1365-1380.DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9819-y

Young, G. (2017). Integrating poor taste into the ongoing debate on the morality of violent video games. The Computer Games Journal, 6(4), 227-237. DOI: 10.1007/s40869-017-0044-5

Young, G. (2017). Knowing how, ability, and the type-token distinction. Synthese, 194(2), 583-607. DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0961-4

Young, G. (2017). Objections to Ostritsch’s argument in “The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer’s moral obligation”. Ethics and Information Technology, 19(3), 209-219. DOI 10.1007/s10676-017-9437-1

Young, G. (2016). Selective scepticism over thought: Am I ever justified in doubting that I think that thought but not this one? Cogent Arts and Humanities, 3(1), 1-14.DOI 10.1080/23311983.2016.1145567

Young, G. (2016). The principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for moral responsibility: A way to avoid the Frankfurt counter-example. Philosophia, 44(3), 961-969.DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9690-2

Young, G. (2015). Are there some things it is morally wrong to make-believe? An examination of imaginative resistance as a measure of the morality of pretence, Cogent Arts and Humanities, 2(1), 1-14.DOI 10.1080/23311983.2015.1076956

Young, G. (2015). Violent video games and morality: A meta-ethical approach. Ethics and Information Technology, 17(4), 311-321. DOI 10.1007/s10676-016-9386-0

Young, G. (2014). Amending the revisionist model of the Capgras delusion: A further argument for the role of patient experience in delusional belief formation. AVANT: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies, 5(3), 89-112

Young, G. (2014). A meta-ethical approach to single-player gamespace: Introducing constructive ecumenical expressivism as a means of explaining why moral consensus is not forthcoming. Ethics and Information Technology, 16(2), 91-102.DOI 10.1007/s10676-014-9336-7

Young, G. (2013). Enacting taboos as a means to an end; but what end? On the morality of motivations for child murder and paedophilia within gamespace. Ethics and Information Technology, 15(1), 13-23. DOI 10.1007/s10676-012-9306-x

Young, G. (2012). Delusions of death and immortality. A consequence of misplaced being in Cotard patients. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 19(2), 127-140.

Young, G. (2012). In defense of misplaced being and the interactionist account. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 19(2), 149-152.

Young, G. & Whitty, M.T. (2012). Coping with offline prohibited actions in gamespace: A psychological approach to moral well-being in gamers. International Journal of Ethics, 8(3), 237-262.

Whitty, M.T., Young, G., & Goodings, L. (2011). What I won’t do in pixels: Examining the limits of taboo violation in MMORPGs. Computers in Human Behavior, 27(1), 268-275. DOI:10.1016/j.chb.2010.08.004

Young, G. (2011) Beliefs, experiences and misplaced being: An interactionist account of delusional misidentification. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 195-215. DOI 10.1007/s11097-010-9168-9

Young, G. (2011). On abductive inference and delusional belief: Why there is still a role for patient experience within explanations of Capgras delusion. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 16(4), 303-325. DOI: 10.1080/13546805.2010.531626

Young, G. & Whitty, M.T. (2011). Progressive embodiment within cyberspace: Considering the psychological impact of the supermorphic persona. Philosophical Psychology, 24(4), 537-560. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2011.556606

Young, G. & Whitty, M.T. (2011) Should gamespace be a taboo-free zone? Moral and psychological implications for single-player video games. Theory and Psychology, 21(6), 802-820. DOI: 10.1177/0959354310378926

Young, G. (2010). Virtually real emotions and the paradox of fiction: Implications for the use of virtual environments in psychological research. Philosophical Psychology, 23(1), 1-21. DOI: 10.1080/09515080903532274

Young, G. & Whitty, M.T. (2010) Games without frontiers: On the moral and psychological implications of violating taboos within multi-player virtual spaces. Computers in Human Behavior, 26(6),1228-1236. DOI:10.1016/j.chb.2010.03.023

Young, G. & Whitty, M.T. (2010). In Search of the Cartesian Self: An examination of disembodiment within 21st century communication. Theory and Psychology, 20(2), 209-229. DOI: 10.1177/0959354309345633

Young, G. (2009). Case study evidence for an irreducible form of knowing how to: an argument against a reductive epistemology. Philosophia, 37(2), 341-360. DOI 10.1007/s11406-008-9169-x

Young, G. (2009). In what sense ‘familiar’? Examining experiential differences within pathologies of facial recognition. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(3), 628-638. DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2009.06.006

Young, G. (2008). Capgras delusion: An interactionist model. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(3), 863-876. DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2008.01.006

Young, G. (2008). On how a child's awareness of thinking informs explanations of thought insertion. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(3), 848-862. DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2007.05.005

Young, G. (2008). Restating the role of phenomenal experience in the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7(2), 177-189. DOI 10.1007/s11097-007-9048-0

Young, G. (2007). Clarifying ‘Familiarity’: Phenomenal experiences in prosopagnosia and the Capgras delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 14(1), 29-37.

Young, G. (2007). Igniting the flicker of freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt scenario. Philosophia, 35(2), 171-180.

Young, G. (2007). In Defense of Estrangement. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 14(1), 51-56.

Young, G. (2006). Are different affordances subserved by different neural pathways? Brain and Cognition, 62(2), 134-142.

Young, G. (2006). Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts. Philosophical Psychology, 19(6), 823-837.

Young, G. (2006). Preserving the role of conscious decision making in the initiation of intentional action. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(3), 51-68.

Young, G. (2005). Do Carruthers’ examples of absent-mindedness show arbitrariness with regard to phenomenal content? Anthropology and Philosophy, 6(1/2), 89-101.

Young, G. (2005). Ecological perception affords an explanation of object permanence. Philosophical Explorations, 8(2), 189-208.

Young, G. (2004). Bodily knowing: Re-thinking our understanding of procedural knowledge. Philosophical Explorations, 7(1), 37-54.

Book Chapters

Young, G. (forthcoming, 2021). Capgras delusion: An interactionist approach revisited. In E. Sullivan-Bissett (ed.) Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Young, G. (2018). Enacting immorality within gamespace: Where should we draw the line and why? In A. Attrill-Smith, C. Fullwood, M. Keep, & D.J. Kuss (Eds.) Oxford Handbook of Cyberpsychology (pp.588-608). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Young, G. (2014). Capgras delusion. In Magill’s Medical Guide, 7th edition. Salem Press.

Young, G. (2013). Capgras delusion. In H. Pashler (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Mind. San Diego: Sage.

Young, G. & Whitty, M.T. (2012). Coping with offline prohibited actions in gamespace: A psychological approach to moral well-being in gamers. In A.S. Fruili, & L.D. Veneto (Eds.) Psychology of morality (pp.35-60). New York. Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Young, G. (2011). Irreducible forms of knowledge how in patients with visuomotor pathologies: An argument against intellectualism. In A. Newen, A. Bartels, & E-M. Jung (Eds.) Knowledge and representation (pp.31-57). Palo Alto: CSLI Publications and Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.

Young, G. & Whitty, M.T. (2011). Judging all manner of ills: On the importance of psychology rather than morality as an arbiter of taboo permissibility within gamespace. In K. Poels, & S. Malliet (Eds.). Vice city virtue: Moral issues in digital game play (pp.109-134). Leuven: Acco Academic.

Young, G. (2010). Issues and debates within psychology. In P. Banyard, M. Davies, C. Norman, & B. Winder (Eds.), Essential psychology: A core textbook (pp.43-59). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Young, G. (2010). More than simply ‘anomalous’: Elevating the role of phenomenal experience within delusional misidentification. In A.M. Columbus (Ed.), Advances in psychological research, volume 68 (pp.83-115). New York. Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

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